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INTRODUCTION 
Within the context of current economic slowdown Russian business seeks to attract 
additional financing to ensure sustainable growth. However, as the sanctions imposed against the 
state also included the deprivation of loan financing on European and US markets, the options left 
are to look for credit financing on alternative markets or opt for equity funding. The latter in some 
cases implies conducting Initial Public Offering (IPO) to raise funds. Apart from fulfilling the 
main objective, IPO has additional benefits such as a positive impact on firm’s reputation, 
increased transparency as well as higher liquidity. 
In 2014 Russian IPO market was at the lowest point in its development with the retail chain 
Lenta being the only company conducting public offering. However, according to Baker, 
McKenzie, & Oxford Economics (2015) the market is predicted to grow in the following years. 
This once again bring up the question about the choice of the stock exchange for the IPO. From 
2005 to 2014 London Stock Exchange was the most popular choice with 47% of the deals followed 
by MOEX with 42% of the deals (PWC, 2014). Nevertheless, the impact of the stock exchange on 
the IPO underpricing still has received limited coverage in research publications. Foreign and 
domestic investors may have different perception of various aspects of the company and its 
performance.  
One of the crucial aspects which investors evaluate prior to IPO is the corporate 
governance. For example, at LSE companies are encouraged to develop strong governance 
procedures and are advised to achieve the key elements set out in UK Corporate Governance Code 
(LSE, 2012). 
Board of directors, being a central corporate governance mechanism, is especially relevant 
for such matter as IPO, as it is considered to be the future major link between the company and its 
shareholders. There are different perspectives on the role of the board and the impact of its 
attributes on firm performance. One of them is an intellectual capital framework. Board members 
provide intellectual capital which according to multiple empirical studies has a positive 
relationship with different aspects of company performance. IPO results were also analyzed from 
this perspective (Banerjee and Rangamani, 2014; Darmadi et al., 2013; Pan et al., 2012; Thorsell 
and Isaakson, 2014). 
However, there are few research papers studying intellectual capital of boards of directors 
of Russian companies especially in their relationship with IPO. Nonetheless, the surveys by PwC 
(2015), which are partially based on the interviews with directors of top Russian companies, 
indicate not only the growing influence of the boards on corporate strategy, but also a high value 
assigned for different elements of intellectual capital, such as, for example, experience in financial 
8 
 
sector and ties to government bodies (PwC, 2015). Despite these tendencies, there is no evidence 
of intellectual capital’s influence on the investors’ perception and, for example, IPO perspectives.  
Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between different elements of 
intellectual capital of board of directors and IPO performance, using evidence from Russian 
companies which went public on MOEX and LSE. 
The research goal can be broken down into the following research objectives: 
1. Study the theoretical background on Intellectual Capital of Board of Directors;   
2. Analyze previous research on Board’s Intellectual Capital impact on financial and IPO 
performance;  
3. Propose an empirical methodology for the analysis of Intellectual Capital’s impact on IPO 
performance;  
4. Build and describe a sample for the analysis;  
5. Conduct an empirical study on the built sample; 
6. Interpret results and provide managerial implications based on the findings; 
7. Apply the findings to explain the difference in IPO success level on MOEX and LSE. 
The paper has the following structure: introduction, chapter 1 containing theoretical 
background of intellectual capital of board of directors and a review of prior empirical studies, 
chapter 2 devoted to the empirical study and conclusion.  
The first chapter starts with introducing board of directors as a central corporate 
governance mechanism. Four different perspectives are applied for defining the board’s function 
and its attributes which influence company performance. Then, intellectual capital is introduced 
as alternative framework to answer these questions. After analyzing theoretical background of the 
concept, we proceed with analyzing previous empirical studies on the impact of different elements 
of intellectual capital on various aspects of firm performance and identify the research gap. 
The second chapter is devoted to describing the methodology of the empirical study, the 
study itself and to discussion of the obtained results. The sections of the chapter cover hypotheses 
development, sample selection, data description, linear regression model and its variables. The 
obtained results are analyzed in order to derive research findings and managerial implications. In 
the final part of the chapter the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research are 
being discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS A 
POTENTIAL DETERMINANT FOR IPO PERFORMANCE 
 
1.1. Board of directors as a central corporate governance mechanism 
According to OECD, corporate governance framework should promote transparent and fair 
markets together with efficient allocation of resources. It should be consistent with the rule of law 
and support effective supervision and enforcement (OECD, 2015). Board of directors is a central 
mechanism of this framework which should ensure:  
• Strategic guidance of the company; 
• Effective monitoring of management; 
• Board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
Board of directors is appointed or elected by shareholders to run the company on their 
behalf (ACCA, 2012). There is no general formula for the board’s composition. The number of 
directors may differ for each individual company and the requirements for their qualification are 
established by the legislation of particular country. However, there are general classifications for 
the types of directors. These classifications are relevant for this study as the board’s composition 
is one of the main attributes of the board which determines its performance.  
The first classification distinguishes executive, non-executive and independent directors. 
Executive directors are involved in the day-to-day management or are full-time salaried employees 
of the company or its subsidiary (Deloitte, 2014). They are intended to provide expertise about the 
actual state of business and should defend the interests of the company, which may be different 
from the interests of the management team.  
Non-executive directors are not involved in management of the company and act as 
providers of objective judgment. Non-executive directors should meet without the executive 
directors several times per year in order to evaluate performance and actions of the executive 
management team (ACCA, 2012). Independent director is a type of non-executive director who is 
not involved in management of the company, neither is a representative of a shareholder or has 
any kind of interest in the company. In other words, independent director is not involved in any 
kind of business relationship with the company (ACCA, 2012).  
The second classification divides board’s members in two groups: outside and inside 
directors. Basically, given classification replicates the first one as inside directors are both 
executive and non-executive ones, whereas independent directors are outside ones. 
It is also important to mention that there are two types of boards of directors: unitary boards 
and two-tier boards. Unitary boards are typical for Anglo-Saxon law and imply that company’s 
directors serve together in one board comprising both executive and non-executive directors 
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(ACCA, 2012). Two-tier boards can be found in European countries. Executive directors comprise 
the management board and deal with such issues as establishing company’s objectives and 
implementing necessary measures. Meanwhile, non-executive directors in the supervisory board 
deal with monitoring these decisions on behalf of other parties. 
Despite the existence of different definitions of board of directors’ functions, there is no 
overarching framework for them, as there is an ongoing discussion about board’s role and its 
impact on company performance among researchers in the corporate governance field. In their 
review of both theoretical and empirical research on the roles of the board Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
determined four different prominent perspectives on the issue under consideration. Each 
perspective defends its own view on the role of the board and its attributes effecting the 
performance of the company. 
Legalistic perspective 
This perspective is built on corporate law and states that board’s responsibilities are limited 
by respective legislation. This way the functions of the board are: 
• Selecting and replacing CEO; 
• Representing shareholders’ interests; 
• Advising and controlling top management of the company.  
Regarding the features of the board which influence the performance of the company, 
advocates for legalistic perspective distinguish four of them: board composition, its characteristics, 
structure and processes. Board’s composition covers its size, distribution between outside and 
inside directors and presence of ethnic minorities and women. Characteristics of the board is quite 
a broad term which covers both individual characteristics of the directors (age, experience, 
education, stock ownership etc.) and collective ones (focus on external or internal issues, 
independence etc.). Structure of the board means its organization, number and types of committees 
and division of labor between them. Board’s processes imply decision-making activities and the 
management style of the board. 
These four attributes determine company’s performance in two primary roles: service and 
control. Service involves giving counsel to the executive team, establishing useful relationships in 
the community and enhancing company’s reputation within it (Carpenter, 1988). Control means 
evaluating both CEO’s and company’s performance from the shareholders’ interests perspective 
(Chapin, 1986). 
One can argue for the following limitations of this perspective: 
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• Legalistic approach tends to ignore possible contributions of the board into cooperation 
with different actors of the external community as well as into developing and 
implementing the strategy of the firm; 
• Empirical research with such approach primarily focuses on board composition, this way 
underestimating the importance of the board’s structure and processes; 
• The link between board’s attributes and its roles and performance is relatively indirect. 
Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence perspective is based on sociology and organizational theory and 
perceives the board as a mechanism to supply executives with timely information and resources 
vital for company’s success. This way firm’s reputation in the community and efficiency of its 
management operations are supposed to be enhanced.  
This perspective distinguishes only two main attributes of the board influencing its 
performance: composition and characteristics. However, they are linked to three roles of the board 
as service and control are combined with strategy. That shows that advocates for resource 
dependency perspective have a broader view than the one for legalistic perspective. Strategic role 
does not directly imply development and execution of the strategy, but rather counseling the CEO 
in this field. 
Resource dependence perspective is subject to certain limitations too: 
• The exact strategies for board’s interaction with external environment are not covered by 
this concept; 
• There are limited empirical findings on how firms fit board’s composition to the 
environment and how it exactly influences company’s performance. 
Class Hegemony theory 
Class hegemony perspective can be directly linked to the Marxist sociology (Mills, 2000). 
The board is perceived as the instrument of ruling capitalist elite for extracting wealth. One of the 
main arguments for this perspective is an exclusive nature of board membership with exclusion of 
most social groups.  
The theory argues for three main attributes of the board: composition, characteristics and 
processes resulting in the same board’s roles as in the legalistic approach: service and control.  
The approach has serious limitations: 
• There is not much empirical evidence on how exactly the boards extract wealth; 
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• The approach ignores the modern trends when intuitional investors such as pension funds 
hold corporate stocks. This way the boards are enriching the society rather than a group of 
capitalists. 
Agency theory 
Agency theory perspective can be called the dominant one among corporate governance 
studies on contribution of boards to firm performance. This theory is built around contradiction 
between agents (executives) and owners (shareholders). The board of directors in this case 
executes a critical function of control and monitoring management to align its actions with 
shareholders’ interests. 
Agency theory argues for all the four attributes of the board similarly to legalistic 
perspective, but puts more emphasis on the processes part, especially on decision making process. 
With regards to composition of the board, it is important to mention that in agency theory the 
predominant view is that an effective board is comprised of outside directors (Dalton and Daily, 
1998). This point of view is backed by empirical research proving outsider’s positive effect on 
shareholder wealth (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990).  
Apart from control function, which is the core one, agency theory also stands for service 
and strategy functions. From this perspective, it can be called an overarching one. Agency theory 
argues for the importance of high proportion of non-executive directors as one of the prerequisites 
for the effective execution of control function (Fama, 1980). The rationale is that non-executive 
directors are not pursuing the same interests as company managers. 
However, agency theory is also not immune for limitations: 
• Agency theory perspective ignores the trend towards enhancing working conditions as a 
main measure to overcome opportunistic behavior of the executive team; 
• There is limited empirical research proving the impact of monitoring function on the 
company’s performance. 
Having briefly analyzed the main points of the four perspectives, we can see that in the 
approach attributes – functions – impact on performance, these perspectives not only differ with 
regards to the functions of the board, but in determining the attributes as well. Apart from that, 
even if we take the broadest perspective on the attributes which gives us four them, it is apparent 
that these categories are too broad, and the framework does not embrace the whole spectrum of 
the board features. That is why, starting from the 1990s in the scientific society the researchers 
started to develop an alternative way to systemize board’s features providing a possibility to 
measure them and their impact on the performance of the firm. This is an intellectual capital 
framework which would be analyzed further. 
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1.2. Intellectual capital of board of directors 
1.2.1.  Theoretical background of intellectual capital 
During the last decades, there is a clear trend showing that physical assets, such as plants, 
equipment and property, commonly recognized on the balance sheet, have decreased in their 
importance and impact on the market capitalization of the company, giving the ground to more 
intangible forms of capital known as intellectual capital (Isaac et al., 2010; Marr, 2008; Wang, 
2008). A vivid example of this trend is that Uber, a taxi aggregator having mostly intangible assets 
on its balance sheet, has higher market capitalization than BMW, the actual car manufacturer with 
30 manufacturing facilities in 14 countries on 4 continents. More than that, intangible assets 
represent only one element of intellectual capital, whereas its major part is not reflected in the 
balance sheet at all. 
The strategic impact of intellectual capital is never in question. In modern business 
environment, capturing, codification and circulation of information together with acquisition of 
new competencies via training and development results in re-engineering of business processes. 
This way, present and future success in competition is based on strategic knowledge management 
rather than on strategic allocation of physical and financial resources (Bontis, 1998). 
In the field of corporate governance the concept of the intellectual capital gained 
importance and recognition in the beginning of the 21st century due to a vast number of empirical 
research starting from 1998. These studies confirmed the strategic impact of intellectual capital on 
the firm performance and its possible role of the key differentiator in the level of company’s 
success (Clarke et al., 2011; Khan, 2014; Maditinos et al., 2011).  
Intellectual capital framework 
Before proceeding to the intellectual capital of board of directors, it is necessary to provide 
a general classification of intellectual capital and emphasize the key points about each of its 
subcomponents. Generally, intellectual capital is divided into 3 main subcomponents: human, 
social and structural capital (Figure 1). Social capital is the most discussable term as in different 
theoretical research one can find such alternatives as relational (Marr, 2008) and customer capital 
(Bontis, 1998).  
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Figure 1. Structure of the intellectual capital 
Human capital includes both a broader consideration of total human resources of the 
company and more specific characteristics of individual employees which constitute their 
professional competence, i.e. knowledge, skills, experience etc. (McGregor, Tweed, & Pech, 
2004). The theory of human capital gained importance in the middle of the 20th century, as it was 
considered to be a separate factor of economic growth in the neoclassical economic growth model 
developed by Robert Solow, for which he was awarded a Noble Prize in 1987. From then on, a lot 
of studies on the influence of human capital on firm performance have been conducted.  
The elements of human capital can be divided in two following groups. First, the concept 
of human capital covers all the relevant demographics of the company’s employees, meaning age, 
education, gender, ethnicity etc. (Johnson et al., 2012). Second, it concerns various aspects of their 
experience, such as industry experience, experience as CEO, previous employment in financial 
institutions and other relevant fields. 
Structural capital deals with mechanisms and structures of the company which are 
supposed to support employees in their efforts for optimal intellectual performance and overall 
firm success (Bontis, 1999). It can be divided into 2 parts, which are process and innovative capital. 
Process capital includes organizational culture, procedures and rules. These elements allow for 
development of intellectual capital of the company, as without them the company can be perceived 
only as a cumulative human capital of its employees. A vivid example of the role of process capital 
is the Silicon Valley with its “embrace failure” culture. This supportive culture is an element of 
structural capital which promotes learning by trying and doing things and, this way, facilitates 
value creation from the human capital. As for innovative capital, it includes intangible assets of 
the company such as patents and know-how. 
Human 
capital
Social 
capital
Structural 
capital
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Social capital, as it was previously mentioned, is the most broad and discussable concept. 
Adler and Kwon (2002) collected 24 different definitions of social capital which can be systemized 
into two categories, focusing on external and internal ties respectively. Internal ties perspective 
puts the main emphasis on relations of the actors of the company with each other, their ability to 
act as a group, whereas external ties concept covers relationships with actors from outside the firm. 
One of the examples of external perspective is the definition by Bontis (1998): “Social capital 
comprises the knowledge embedded in all the relationships an organization develops, whether it 
is with customers, competitors, suppliers, trade associations or government bodies”. Fukuyama’s 
(1997) "the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations" 
is an example of internally oriented definition. Adler and Kwon (2002) attempted to synthesize 
these two perspectives into one definition and proposed “Social capital is the goodwill available 
to individuals or groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. 
Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor”.  
3 dimensions of social capital 
Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) argued for 3 dimensions of social capital: structural, relational 
and cognitive one. The distinction between structural and relational dimensions is built upon the 
discussion about structural and relational embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992). Structural 
embeddedness concerns the network between the actors, its presence or absence, configuration, 
density and hierarchy. Relational embeddedness, in its turn, covers personal relationship 
developed between the two actors. The idea is that people may have the same position in the 
network (structural dimension), but have special attitude for different networks which determines 
the nature of their relationship. The cognitive dimension refers to the resources facilitating shared 
interpretation among the parties concerned. This conceptualization recognizes that both the tie and 
the nature of that tie are important. 
Benefits of social capital 
One main direct benefit of social capital is information. Social capital facilitates access to 
broader sources of information and improves information's quality, relevance, and timeliness 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002). The type of information may differ from updates about the latest research 
in the field to job opportunities and innovations. The important aspect of these benefits is that they 
can lead to the positive externalities not only for a person itself, but for the broader aggregate. 
The second type of benefits is power benefit. It can be derived from the ties with powerful 
organizations such as government institutions or from the ties within the network of people having 
obligation for a person. These power benefits help the actors to protect their interests and get things 
done.   
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The third benefit of social capital is solidarity, namely, closure and trust. This benefit is 
primarily derived from internal ties. An atmosphere of trust within the company triggers higher 
commitment level and, consequently, lowers monitoring and controlling costs.  
However, for every benefit there is its risk. First of all, maintaining a broad network of 
external contacts requires permanent costs. The cost efficiency of this activity is discussable and 
quite often does not pay off. Second, there is a trade-off between information and power benefit. 
In order to get maximum information benefits, one should maintain as broad number contacts as 
possible, whereas power benefits can be derived only from longstanding relationship requiring 
time investments. More than that, the dependency in case of power benefits is mutual, so the 
second party can be against some contacts in case of the conflict of interests. Third, solidarity is a 
great benefit, but sometimes it may lead to inertia within the firm which hinders the innovation 
activities. 
Intellectual capital of board of directors 
Overall, judging by a brief analysis of the three main elements of intellectual capital, we 
can see that as far as board of directors is concerned, the concepts of human and social capital are 
applicable, whereas structural capital is more relevant for the organizational level. This approach 
is reflected in the academic literature as most of the research papers, both theoretical and empirical 
ones, are mainly focused on human and social capital of board of directors (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Framework to define the elements of intellectual capital of board of directors  
Source: Berezinets et al. (2016), p. 637. 
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The main findings of the theoretical studies would be discussed in the next sections. 
1.2.2.  Human capital of board of directors 
The provision of human capital is the actual reason of appointing individuals to the board 
of directors (Volonte, 2016). This point of view is more related to resource dependency theory 
than to agency theory, as the latter does not demand different skills from the directors to execute 
their functions.  
Demographic characteristics 
The general classification of human capital elements can be applied to the level of board 
of directors as well. As far as demographic characteristics are concerned, they are traditionally 
analyzed from the standpoint of their relationship with the board’s overall efficiency, decision-
making strategies and firm financial performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). One of the most 
controversial variables is such fundamental one as an average age of the board’s members. The 
key point is that it serves as a proxy for both experience and risk aversion (Johnson et al., 2013). 
Consequently, it is claimed to have both positive and negative relationship with firm performance 
depending on the challenges from the external environment.  
The same logic can be applied to such characteristic as directors’ education level. The 
degrees held by the board’s members per se do not guarantee positive impact on the firm well-
being. While it is generally agreed on that the educational level has zero or positive impact on 
company’s value and its financial results (Kim & Lim, 2010; Rose, 2007), several studies suggest 
that innovation level can be negatively influenced by presence of highly educated directors 
(Wincent et al., 2010).  
Such parameters as gender, race and ethnicity can be analyzed together, as they contribute 
to the overall level of diversity of the board. Similarly to age and education, there are mixed 
findings about its impact, claiming negative, zero or positive relationship between diversity and 
various aspects of firm performance (Carter et al., 2010; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Post et al. 2011).  
Another important demographic characteristic is citizenship. For some countries the 
presence of foreigners adds additional value in terms firm’s perception by the market (Choi et al., 
2012). However, it is worth remembering that the board should include the directors from the 
home country, which once again brings up the question about the required level of diversity.  
Overall conclusion for the demographic part is that these parameters should be analyzed in 
close relationship with skills and experiences of the directors and can’t serve as stand-alone proxies 
for hypotheses formulation.  
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Independence 
The level of independence is mostly a structural element of the board, but it can be also 
linked to the human capital concept. As independent directors bring outside expertise and are not 
subject to developing any biases about firm performance, they are said to have positive impact on 
the company’s performance.  
Since demographic characteristics are said to be analyzed together with skills and 
experience of the board’s members, the latter ones also require certain systematization. Having 
analyzed the theoretical approaches to this issue, we propose a following classification.  
Industry experience 
Industry specific experience may bring additional value to the board of directors. Within 
the context of the same industry, an experienced director in the field can bring additional insights 
on the ways to overcome them and contribute to the faster adoption for volatile external 
environment. The study by Drobetz et al. (2016) confirmed this assumption by identifying positive 
relationship of board’s industry experience not only with firm’s value, but also with the level of 
success of the investment decisions. This element can be of a particular value in combination with 
independent status of directors for young entrepreneurial firms, as they can compensate the lack 
of expertise of their executive directors by appointing outside industry experts to the board (Kor 
and Misangyi, 2008). 
Other relevant experience 
Depending on the type of activity the company is carrying out as well as on its strategic 
plans, the company may seek to appoint the directors with expertise in the respective field. One of 
the most commonly adopted one in the theoretical research of board’s intellectual capital is 
financial expertise. Various studies confirm the tendency to appoint directors from the fields of 
earnings management (An and Jin, 2004), venture capitalism (Kroll et al., 2007). Other fields of 
interest are M&A and post-integration experience (Kroll et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2008). 
However, it should be pointed out that, despite having a clear evidence for this tendency, it is hard 
to empirically prove the impact of these appointments, as their effect is needed to be separated 
from the one of other relevant factors.  
Organizational tenure 
Organizational tenure implies previous experience in the analyzed board of directors. The 
underlying assumption is that this experience helps to build a company specific expertise as well 
as to establish fruitful collaboration with other directors, which is the focus of the social capital 
section. However, this variable is believed to have U-inverted relationship (Musteen et al., 2010) 
with both strategic and reputational aspects of firm performance. This means that after a certain 
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threshold a group of directors would experience a decrease in efficiency of their performance due 
to co-created biases and degrading motivation. 
Human capital heterogeneity 
This is the variable which represents an attempt to measure the overall effect of all elements 
of human capital of board of directors. However, there is no commonly approved view on the level 
of heterogeneity. It seems clear that the company should aim at diversity of its board, but at the 
same time after a certain level this heterogeneity may result in conflicts and lead to low efficiency 
of the board (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). So, we can conclude that this variable would also has 
the U-inverted relationship with firm performance, which leads to the idea that human capital of 
board directors should be analyzed in interdependence with the social one. 
1.2.3.  Social capital of board of directors 
From the theoretical introduction on social capital based on the literature review by Adler 
and Kwon (2002) we know that this concept embraces two perspectives, internal and external one. 
Social capital of board of directors can be treated as implicit and intangible set of resources 
available by virtue of individual relationships of members of board of directors (Nicholson et al., 
2004). Similarly to the general concept, these relationships (ties) can be divided into two types, 
external and internal one. External ties of board of directors refer to linkages that involve others 
outside the organization, while internal ties involve interpersonal relationships between directors 
on the board (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016). Board’s ability to process information acquired 
externally through its directors’ social connections depends on the degree of connectedness inside 
the board, as it favors trust and collaboration between board members, enhancing teamwork and 
cohesiveness inside the board (Kim and Cannella, 2008).  
External social capital 
Board’s external social capital incorporates the level of outside connections of the board’s 
members and the resources potentially derived from these connections (Kim, 2005). These 
resources are considered to serve as a source of competitive advantage. Thus, the primary function 
of external social capital is that of “bridging” the firm to the external environment. Its examples 
include outside directors’ ties to the firms in which they are/were employed, seats on the board of 
other firms or social capital in the form of the director’ personal relationships, affiliations, and 
social standing (Johnson et al., 2013; Kim, 2005, 2007).  
High intensity of external ties results in obtaining critical resources, namely information, 
power and solidarity benefits, which, in their turn, have a positive influence on firm performance 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
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If we apply the general classification of social capital benefits to the board of directors, we 
would receive a following classification. First, external ties provide channels for communication 
with the external environment (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman et al., 2000). Second, 
directors with a broad network can obtain support from influential agents or external stakeholders 
that may be critical to the organization’s performance (Hillman et al., 2000; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2006). Third, the perception of legitimacy of decisions taken by the company’s management team 
will be improved by the presence of board members who are highly connected to organizations 
with established business reputations (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006). This is the possible reason for 
having a CEO of a successful company on your board. Presence in multiple boards is also valued 
in the literature, as these directors form connections with other firms (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011).  
However, despite the abovementioned benefits, there can be associated costs. Serving on 
many boards takes director’s limited time and attention (Harris and Shimizu, 2004), which will 
adversely affect the quality of their contributions (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
High level of external social capital in a board could, therefore, lead to lower involvement 
from its board members. Once a certain level has been reached, an increase in number of external 
ties might create more disadvantages than advantages with a negative influence on the board’s 
performance as a group. 
Internal social capital 
The importance of internal social capital of board of directors should not be 
underestimated, as individual directors may not possess a complete skillset and knowledge to meet 
firm’s needs. However, acting as a group they can pool their knowledge to execute their 
governance functions effectively (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
Board internal social capital determines the ability of the board to function effectively. Its 
source lies in the relationships between the directors (Barroso-Castro et al., 2016). Internal ties 
enhance trust within the board and facilitate an exchange of information and knowledge (Kim, 
2005; Kim and Cannella, 2008; Stevenson and Radin, 2009). Trust is the condition that determines 
the willingness of directors to share their external social capital benefits within the board (Kim 
and Cannella, 2008). However, internal ties can also degrade board’s performance after reaching 
a certain level. Several studies (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999; Kim, 2005; Reagans and Zuckerman, 
2001) have demonstrated that excessive internal social capital may have negative effects such as 
creation of groupthink, cliques and other dysfunctions, that are the result of homogeneity of the 
views of the directors. 
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Barroso-Castro et al. (2016) proposed a multiplicative effect of both types of social capital, 
in which high levels of internal social capital intensify the positive effects of external ties on firm 
performance and cushion its negative effects, when the level of director’s overload reaches very 
high levels. 
With regards to reinforcing positive effects, it is necessary to remember that having social 
capital does not necessarily imply applying it to decision making process (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
Barroso-Castro et al. (2016) believe that a higher internal social capital could further drive the 
deployment and mobilization of external social capital. Conversely, low levels of internal social 
capital may imply that directors with external ties are not able to fully deploy their potential 
resources to the board’s decision-making processes.  
Government officials 
Political network ties are believed to have positive relationship with organizational 
performance. Both the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) and the political 
resources literature (Hillman et al., 2004) show that ties to government structures facilitate 
legitimacy, status, and access to valuable resources and information.  
For companies operating in emerging markets and transition economies, the development 
of political networks is even more crucial, as the governments still hold control of major financial 
and regulatory resources. The benefits of this kind of external social capital translate into higher 
profitability and market valuation through various forms such as favorable access to bank loans, 
tax breaks, and preferential regulatory policies. 
However, there should be highlighted the potential risks political ties may generate over 
time. A competitive advantage obtained through political network may be lost due to sudden 
changes in the political (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) and business environment (Sun et al., 
2010). 
Hillman (2005) claims that four general benefits derived from the social capital also apply 
to the political ties. Government officials can provide advice and counsel regarding the public 
policy issues, establish channels of communication with different kinds of political decision 
makers, lobby favorable political decisions through their and facilitate legitimacy (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999).  
Lester et al. (2008) believe that any former government official’s value as a member of 
board of director depends on the combination of their human and social capital. This statement is 
built upon the view of Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) who argued that these two kinds of intellectual 
capital are conceptually and empirically difficult to separate. Their impact on the company’s 
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performance should be measured as cumulative. This approach would be applied in the empirical 
part of this study. 
1.3. Empirical evidence of the impact of board of directors’ intellectual capital 
1.3.1.  Intellectual capital of board of directors and firm’s financial results 
Before proceeding to the empirical part of this study, it is vital to make an overview of the 
key findings about the impact of the intellectual capital on different aspects of company’s 
performance as well as on the actual approaches to measure it. We would concentrate on both 
social and human elements of intellectual capital following the proposition by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998) about social capital’ interconnectedness with human capital. This approach is also 
justified by our findings about limitations of independent measurement of human capital impact.  
Human capital 
Volonte (2016) targeted the firms comprising Swiss Performance Index (SPI) and collected 
information about 4021 members of boards of directors. Firm performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q (total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of total equity divided by total assets) 
was studied in its relationship with director’s human capital, i.e. international experience, CEO 
experience, industrial and financial know-how. The results in indicated that the firm diversification 
and internationalization affect this relationship. International experience proved to be especially 
important for globally exposed companies. As the grade of diversification increases, industrial 
know how tends to have negative impact on the firm performance, whereas financial know how 
turns out to be a beneficial one. In contrast, CEO experience hampers the growth, if the level of 
internationalization is increasing. Overall, the study shows inapplicability of “one size fits all” 
approach, because the benefits of human capital strongly depend on the company’s strategy. 
Another argumentation against “one size fits all” is provided by the study by Bohren et al. 
(2010). The authors empirically proved that there is no convincing economic reason for requiring 
by law or code a minimum number of the firm directors to be employees, be independent, be of a 
certain gender, or only hold a few directorships. The evidence shows that the company creates 
more value for the shareholders, when the board has no executive directors, when its directors 
have strong internal ties, and when gender diversity is low. No relationship between firm 
performance and board independence is found. Performance of the company is measured with 
Tobin Q, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Sales (ROS).  
Some elements of human capital were also put under scrutiny. Industrial know-how 
(experience) was empirically proved to have a potential to enhance the decision-making processes 
of the companies. That once again proves that the board’s functions go beyond the control and 
monitoring central for the agency theory. Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) argue that industry 
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specific know-how has positive relationship with the sales growth, whereas Kor and Misangyi 
(2008) suggest that a shortage of industrial experience of the management team of young firms 
can to some extent be compensated by industrial experience of their corporate directors. 
Financial expertise is also an important criterion when the company is considering 
candidates for corporate boards as, for example, in the USA, it is legally demanded to have 
financially literate directors on audit committees. In addition, some countries, especially Germany 
and Japan, historically have had a significant banking-influence in their corporate governance 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
A series of studies focus on the role of outsiders and foreigners in the board composition. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) used OLS regression to analyze the impact of foreign directors on 
the market value of 225 Swedish and Norwegian firms. The results show that Anglo-American 
board members have positive impact on public companies. The effect appears to be stronger in 
case of firms that are larger in terms of market capitalization and older in terms of history (more 
than 30 years old), and in industries such as manufacturing, IT and telecom, and media and 
publishing. The article has a narrow focus on the board composition, namely presence of foreigners 
on the board. Neither human capital of the Anglo-American director, nor their external social 
capital was analyzed. From this perspective, this research just indicates a direction for further 
study, but does not allow for any generalization of its results. 
Choi et al. (2012) took a further step and analyzed the impact of foreign outside directors 
in Korean public companies in connection with their human capital and external connections. They 
also got the results which confirm positive relationship between presence of experienced 
foreigners and firm financial performance. 
Appointing a CEO to the board is discussable issue, as there are contradicting empirical 
studies about its impact and value. Fich (2005) provides evidence that stock markets positively 
react to the appointment of CEOs on boards. In contrast, the study of Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) 
rejects the claim that stock prices react positively, if CEOs are appointed as directors. More than 
that, Jackling and Johl (2009) claim that in the long-term perspective CEO duality appeared to 
have a negative effect on performance.  Finally, Stevenson and Radin (2009) as well as Shukeri et 
al. (2012) find no significant relationship between leadership duality and firm performance. 
Duchin et al. (2009) question the necessity to have outside directors on the board. Their 
main finding is that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring 
information about the firm: when the cost of acquiring information is low, performance increases 
when outsiders are added to the board, and, on the contrary, when the cost of information is high, 
performance gets worse when outsiders are added to the board. 
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The study by Shukeri et al. (2012) aimed at answering the question, do such board 
characteristics as board size, board independence, gender and ethnic diversity have an impact on 
firm performance. Return on Equity (ROE) is used as a measurement for financial results of the 
company. 300 Malaysian public listed companies were randomly selected from each sector. The 
results showed that board size and ethnic diversity have positive relationship with ROE while 
board independence has negative relationship. There is no significant relationship between gender 
diversity on firm performance. The limitation of this study is that it lacks a definitive framework 
to analyze intellectual capital of the board. The characteristics are chosen without taken into 
consideration different aspect of the board’s intellectual capital which hampers managerial 
application of this study. 
The paper by Jackling and Johl (2009) has a similar approach and investigates the impact 
of board composition, board size and multiple board membership on the performance of Indian 
companies measured by ROA and Tobin Q. The study shows that a larger board size and a greater 
proportion of outside directors has a positive impact on firm performance. On the opposite, 
multiple board membership and appeared to have a negative effect on performance. 
Despite that the two studies both found that board size has a positive relationship with firm 
performance, there is an alternative view on this issue. Yermack (1996) presented empirical 
evidence that small board of directors are more effective. He studied 452 large US corporations 
and measured their market valuation using Tobin’s Q. The analysis showed strong relationship 
between small board size and firm market value.  
Social capital 
Barroso-Castro et al. (2016) focused on both external and internal ties of the board.  Their 
research covered the sample of 103 boards of directors companies listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange with their external ties. Internal ties were measured with the variable of co-working 
experience. Return on Sales (ROS) was chosen to be an indicator of the firm performance. The 
results of the research add to the proposition by Kim and Cannella (2008) about the role of the 
internal capital as a mediator in the external capital’s effect on firm performance. Co-working 
experience boosts the positive effect of external ties and attenuates the negative ones. The general 
conclusion is that companies should look for the candidates who have network contacts beyond 
those of current board members, but not so far outside that new director will be unable to function 
as part of an effective team. The study provides a solid ground for future research about the impact 
of social capital on firm performance and emphasizes the importance of studying both dimensions 
of directors’ ties. 
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Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) developed and tested a theoretical model of the effects of 
outside directors’ human and social capital on firm performance measured as sales growth rate. 
Using a longitudinal sample of high technology firms, they found that outside directors’ 
membership on multiple boards, industry-specific managerial experience, and firm-specific 
founding experience make a significant contribution to the sales growth. They also find negative 
interaction effects, indicating the costs of acquiring and combining certain types of outside director 
human and social capital within the board. The core value of the article is an attempt to witness a 
collective impact of social and human capital. As it was covered before, both of these 
subcomponents act as differentiators in the selection process for new directors for the corporate 
board.  
Lee et al. (2012) analyzed the impact of social capital of outside directors on firm 
performance measured by ROA. They used a sample of 480 outside directors from 125 large 
Korean corporations. Both external and internal ties of these directors were taken into account. 
Simple OLS regressions showed that outside directors with broad network of external ties have 
negative impact on the performance of the company. The explanation by the authors is in line with 
the proposition about the adversely effects of excessive external ties by Kor and Sundaramurthy 
(2009). 
Ferris et al. (2003) concentrated on the assumption that multiple directorship may degrade 
firm performance. However, studying the firms on Compustat with at least $100 million in total 
assets, they failed to witness negative relationship between multiple directorship and company’s 
financial results predicted by the theoretical research and summarized by them as a Busyness 
Hypothesis (Ferris et al., 2003).  
Similarly, Devos et al. (2009), who also focused on directors’ interlocks, suggest that being 
a member of multiple board of directors does not have any direct impact on firm performance 
measured by ROA and Tobin Q. However, at the same time there is a certain correlation between 
these two attributes, which was interpreted by an assumption that poorly performing firms are 
more likely to appoint interlocked directors. This proves the importance of differentiating between 
correlation and causation in the empirical studies.  
Hillman (2005) found mixed support for the theoretical assumption that politicians on the 
board of directors are associated with better performance. The number of politicians on the board 
of directors was proved to be significantly and positively related to market-based measures of 
performance, but not to accounting-based measures of performance. This goes along with the 
resource dependence theory and shows that the benefits of external social capital have their 
limitations. 
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Goldman et al. (2009) investigated S&P 500 companies to sort out the ones connected to 
the Republican or Democratic Party of the USA. The authors were interested in the relationship 
between the announcement of nominating new politically connected board member and the stock 
price of the company. The results of the study show that there is on average a positive stock-price 
response to this news. This effect is more significant for the larger companies in the sample, but 
is valid both for Republican and Democratic directors. It is independent of the exact political 
position held by new board member. 
These studies partly prove the importance of politically connected directors on the board. 
However, being focused on the US companies, the studies do not provide an overview of the local 
corporate governance system and the role of government in the business environment.  
Another empirical papers arguing for the positive impact of presence of ex- or current 
government officials in corporate boards (Kim, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000) were analyzing the 
emerging markets, namely China and South Korea. This gives the ground for assumption that 
external ties with government organizations have positive relationship with firm financial results 
no matter which institutional context we are dealing with. 
1.3.2.  Intellectual capital of board of directors and IPO performance 
Most of the authors point out as one of the limitations of their empirical study the lack of 
possibility to isolate the impact of intellectual capital on firm performance from other factors. The 
influence on financial performance appears to have long term nature for them. Year to year 
analysis also questions the implication of the research findings. This provides the argumentation 
to shift the focus to more timely limited aspect of firm performance being Initial Public Offering 
(IPO). Here, the relevance of intellectual capital cannot be questioned, as the market evaluates 
both tangible and intangible assets of the company. The analysis of empirical research revealed a 
number of studies in this field.  
An exploratory study by Burton (2004) examined the companies with recent IPO 
experience. Both the interviews and questionnaire survey demonstrated that at the time of an IPO 
these firms often appointed independent non-executive directors for the first time.  
Human capital 
Banerjee and Rangamani (2014) analyzed how directors’ experience and age relate to the 
grade assigned to a IPO bound company on the Indian stock market. The results of their study 
indicate that directors’ experience does not have any impact on the IPO grade obtained by the 
companies, whereas directors of higher age prove to have a positive impact on it. 
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Social capital 
Board’s external social capital also proved to be a discussable issue among the researchers 
in the field. In line with the resource dependency theory, IPO grade was found to be positively 
influenced by board’s broad network of external contacts by Banerjee and Rangamani (2014), 
Mnif (2010) and Pan et al. (2012). Finkle (1998) emphasized a particular importance of ties with 
venture capital and underwriting firms. However, such core element of external ties as multiple 
directorship is suggested to have negative relationship with IPO success by Fillatochev and Bishop 
(2002) and Thorsell and Isaakson (2014).  
Board composition 
Banerjee and Rangamani (2014), Certo et al. (2001) and Darmadi et al. (2013) found that 
companies with larger board size obtained better IPO grades. Similarly, Mnif (2010) diagnosed a 
positive relationship of board size with IPO performance of French companies. However, Finkle 
(1998) argued for board size irrelevance for IPO underpricing. 
Banerjee and Rangamani (2014) argued for irrelevance of proportion of independent 
directors, whereas for the sample of Indonesian companies Darmadi et al. (2013) even identified 
a negative relationship between board’s independence and IPO success. However, the majority 
authors’ empirical findings showed positive impact of this feature of board of composition 
(Filatochev and Bishop, 2002; Mnif, 2010; Certo et al., 2001; Bertoni et al., 2014). 
The study by Dolvin and Kirby (2016) does not distinguish between different types of 
outside directors and claims that proportion of outside directors is positive related to IPO 
performance (negatively related to IPO underpricing). 
1.4. Major limitations and research gap 
Overall, the review of empirical evidence on the impact of intellectual capital of board of 
directors on firm financial results and its IPO performance revealed a number of limitations which 
allow for identifying a research gap. 
First of all, there is a significant shift towards studying the impact of intellectual capital on 
the overall firm performance. This means that the focus is put on the internal perspective and the 
actual value of human and social capital for the firm. At the same time, as far as IPO concerned, 
the attention is rather paid to the perceived value of intellectual capital by the external actors 
(current or potential shareholders), which may possibly result in having more profound managerial 
implications of the empirical research findings. 
Second, a limited number of studies about the influence on IPO performance apply the 
intellectual capital framework. They are more concerned with structural elements of the board, 
namely its size and proportion of outside/independent directors. As these studies have 
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contradictory results, we can assume that structural components by themselves are not enough to 
explain the IPO performance of the company. Apart from that, even when there were attempts to 
link intellectual capital of the board to IPO performance, they were mostly focusing on one 
particular element. All this leaves the room for further research which would study the cumulative 
effect of the board’s intellectual capital. 
Third, there have not been identified the studies applying the framework to the Russian 
stock market. However, based on the literature review, we can assume that various elements of 
intellectual capital such as, for example, ties to government, presence of foreigners on the board 
and different types of directors’ experience would be especially relevant for the national stock 
market. 
Finally, as there is close to zero empirical evidence on the explanation of the difference in 
IPO underpricing of Russian firms on local (MOEX) and foreign stock exchanges (LSE), 
intellectual capital of the board of directors can be tested for being a potential proxy for explaining 
this difference.  
1.5. Specifics of board of directors and IPO process in Russia 
As the empirical part of this study deals with board of directors of Russian companies, it is 
necessary to highlight some distinctive features of the boards in the country.  
Board’s functions 
Russia is currently undergoing a period of economic downturn. In such complex 
environment, it is critical not to lose focus oт strategic business development while focusing on 
the immediate concerns. The survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015) showed that most 
directors (51%) believe that short-term priorities today prevail over the mid- and long-term goals 
of their companies. At the same time, more than one fourth (27%) of board members are sure that 
their management is pursuing tactical measures to the disadvantage of the strategic interests of 
their businesses. 
The results of the survey also indicate that Russian boards now play a greater role in 
strategic planning and are more involved in dealing with key suppliers, customers and business 
partners. This proves the relevance of resource dependency theory in its link to the intellectual 
capital concept.  
Human capital 
Working experience in the relevant fields was proved to be the most valuable element of 
human capital from the internal perspective, which was analyzed by PwC (2014) while conducting 
a survey for 73 board members of Russian public companies. The most relevant spheres identified 
in the analysis were risk management, experience in international companies and financial 
29 
 
expertise which goes along with theoretical and empirical findings of our literature review. These 
findings go along with the similar studies conducted by McKinsey&Company (2006). 
Social capital 
As for the social capital, the results of the 2015 study conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers confirms high level of attention paid to the social capital aspect of the 
board of directors. Taking into consideration the specifics of the national economy, the main focus 
is put into external social capital of board of directors in the form of ties to government. 68% of 
respondents of the survey indicated that during the economic slowdown they were expecting 
alterations in board’s composition, namely appointment of high-ranking government officials as 
such directors would provide these companies with additional competitive advantage, which 
would, consequently, enable the firms to leverage the crisis situation (PwC, 2015). 
Board composition 
As far as board composition is concerned, the boards of directors of Russian public 
companies have on average 10 members, including four independent directors (Appendix 2) (PwC, 
2012).  Boards of directors are elected for terms of one year or less, in conjunction with Russian 
legal requirements. As for diversity, it should be noted that across all board member roles of the 
top 50 Russian public companies, only 7% are held by females; 43% of the companies reported 
that their boards had no females at all (PwC, 2012). 
Most Russian boards primarily target retired and active top executives when searching for 
independent directors. 94% of companies set formal requirements or recommendations related to 
board candidates’ experience, skills and knowledge (PwC, 2014). Thus, we can say that a concept 
of directors’ human capital is recognized within Russian business society. Additionally, it can be 
mentioned that 10% of the top 50 Russian public companies have a senior (lead) independent 
director (PwC, 2012). 
CEOs are not present on Russian boards, as it is stated by the law that a CEO cannot be a 
board chairperson in the same company. Therefore, such element of human capital section as CEO 
duality is irrelevant for the Russian market. 
1.6.  Summary of Chapter 1 
In this chapter we start by reviewing the concept of board of directors being a central 
mechanism of corporate governance framework according to OECD and provide an overview of 
classifications for boards of directors and the types of directors. As the board’s main functions 
remain being a controversial issue for the researchers in the field, we apply four most commonly 
accepted perspectives to define the role of the board as well as board’s attributes effecting firm 
performance. As all these perspectives are subject to certain limitations, we opt for the most recent 
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approach to systemizing board’s features and measuring their impact, which is an intellectual 
capital framework.  
There are three main elements of intellectual capital: human, structural and social capital. 
However, as it is defined in our literature review, on the level of board of directors only human 
and social capital can be distinguished (Berezinets et al., 2016). The provision of intellectual 
capital is the reason for appointing directors to the boards. On the one hand, human capital covers 
various aspects of directors’ demographic characteristics, their experience, organizational tenure 
and status, meaning being non-executive or independent directors. On the other hand, together 
with the human capital each individual possesses social capital which can be divided into two 
parts. Internal social capital implies the relationship between the directors that determines the 
ability of the board to function effectively, whereas external social capital incorporates the level 
of outside connections of the board’s members and the resources potentially derived from these 
connections (Kim, 2005). For example, ties to government can be very beneficial in the countries 
with high involvement of the state in the economy such as, for example, Russia.  High intensity of 
these ties leads to obtaining critical resources, namely information, power and solidarity benefits, 
which have a potential positive influence on firm performance (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
Analysis of the empirical studies shows that researchers found significant relationship 
between various elements of board’s intellectual capital and different aspects of company’s 
performance. However, as we discovered throughout the review of these studies,  there are few 
studies measuring impact of board’s intellectual capital on IPO as the majority of them only covers 
the structural features of the board. This identified research gap can be narrowed by applying the 
concept for the Russian public companies. More than that, board’s intellectual capital is a potential 
determinant for explaining the difference is success levels of IPOs on MOEX and LSE. 
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CHAPTER 2. COMPARTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL 
CAPITAL OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON IPO PERFORMANCE OF RUSSIAN 
COMPANIES ON MOEX AND LSE 
 
2.1.   Methodology and hypotheses formulation 
The proposed empirical study is aimed at covering the identified research gap. The first 
step is to formulate the hypotheses, testing which would enable us to prove that relationship 
between different elements of board’s human and social capital and IPO performance of Russian 
companies exist. What is more, it is expected to identify the difference of this relationship on 
Moscow Exchange (MOEX) and London Stock Exchange (LSE). The assumptions for our 
hypotheses should be built upon theoretical findings of prior research discussed in the literature 
review part, namely the impact of human and social capital on the firm financial performance and 
its IPO success. Both intellectual capital elements were proved to have the positive impact, that is 
why, two factors of human capital and two factors of social capital, internal and external one were 
chosen to formulate the hypotheses. 
Human capital of board of directors and IPO performance 
The first element of human capital under consideration is closely related to the concept of 
perception of the company by investors. Russian companies representing a country with a 
relatively young market economy tend to seek expertise from abroad. This also applies to the board 
of directors of public companies. According to the survey by Deloitte (2015) (Appendix 1), 61% 
of Russian companies have at least one foreign board member and the average share of foreigners 
is 22%. As, for example, in Western Europe with its cross-border movement of professionals this 
number is 24%, we can conclude that Russian companies value appointing foreigners to the board. 
What is more, for LSE this number is even 30% (Deloitte, 2015), so it would be interesting to see 
what impact does it have on company’s IPO perspectives. 
Several studies confirm the positive impact of presence of foreigners in the board on the 
financial performance of the firm (Choi et al., 2012; Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). However, these 
studies do not allow for distinguishing of this effect for developed and emerging markets, that is 
why, it would bring additional value to check if there is a relationship between the share of foreign 
directors and IPO success of Russian companies, especially taking into consideration the proposed 
comparison of MOEX and LSE. 
What should be pointed out with regards to the foreigners appointed to the boards of 
directors of Russian companies is that from out literature review, we can assume that a foreign 
director by default has other elements of intellectual capital such as independence status, expertise 
in relevant spheres and external social capital. So, by testing the formulated hypothesis, we will 
not only check whether there is am impact of presence of these directors, but also the quality of 
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their intellectual capital as negative relationship would mean that the reason for their appointments 
were others than provision of intellectual capital (Volonte, 2016). 
All this leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1a There is a positive relationship between the share of foreign directors in the board of 
directors and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX 
H1b There is a positive relationship between the share of foreign directors in the board of 
directors and IPO performance of Russian companies on LSE 
Second element of the human capital is broadening the concept of directors’ expertise to 
all the board members. The focus is put on the industry experience of company’s directors. This 
issue gained a lot of attention from the researchers in the field of intellectual capital worldwide 
(Drobetz et al., 2016; Kor and Misangyi, 2008) and in Russia as well (Dulyak, 2015). 
This parameter was confirmed to be positively related to almost all the aspects of firm 
activity meaning overall efficiency, financial results and, what is relevant for this study, IPO 
performance. The basic explanation for this is that within the context of the same industry, firms 
are basically facing the same problems no matter which field they concern being legislation, 
technology, financing etc. (Kor and Misangyi, 2008). This way, an experienced director in the 
field can bring additional insights on the ways to overcome them and contribute to the faster 
adoption for volatile external environment. 
The study by Dulyak (2015) covering the board of directors of Russian public companies 
does not apply intellectual capital framework, but includes such variable as directors’ industry 
experience. The research findings suggest that it is one of the core determinants for positive impact 
of the board on firm overall efficiency. That is why, it would be fruitful to extend this analysis to 
the case of IPOs of these companies.  
Following the abovementioned reasoning, we elaborate the following hypotheses about the 
positive impact of average industry experience of the board members: 
H2a There is a positive relationship between average experience in the industry of the 
board’s members and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX 
H2b There is a positive relationship between average experience in the industry of the 
board’s members and IPO performance of Russian companies on LSE 
Social capital of board of directors and IPO performance 
The proposed research design incorporates both internal and external perspectives of social 
capital of board of directors. Internal perspective addresses co-working experience of the board’s 
members. However, it is hard to measure the intensity of these internal connections as board 
members tend to be changed quite frequently. The proposed solution from previous empirical 
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studies (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003) is to use such variable as average tenure of the board 
members. Director’s tenure partially covers the experience of working with other members, as a 
high average tenure of the board’s members implies that at least the majority of them have co-
working experience.  At the same time, it also includes a certain human capital aspect, as from a 
relatively long tenure it can be assumed that this director is aware of the main internal processes 
of the firm and has taken part in decision making before. 
This factor was empirically proved to have a positive impact on the firm financial results 
as it increases the efficiency of the board of directors (Carpenter, 2002; Fisher and Pollock, 2004). 
However, it is necessary to remember that some researchers claim that after a certain point, long 
history of co-working experience may result in the decrease of the efficiency. This concern should 
be covered in the descriptive statistics section of the chosen data sample. 
Building on this, we can elaborate the following hypotheses: 
H3a There is a positive relationship between the average tenure of the board’s members 
and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX 
H3b There is a positive relationship between the average tenure of the board’s members 
and IPO performance of Russian companies on LSE 
Turning to the external perspective of the board’s social capital, we have identified two 
potential proxies for measuring it: ties to other boards of directors and ties to the government. The 
choice was made in favor of adoption of the second one due to well-known fact of the influence 
of Russian government on the national economy together with the results of preliminary research, 
which showed that multiple directorship normally used for measuring the ties to other boards in 
Russia often increases 20 boards. Most of these boards are the ones of the subsidiaries of the firm 
or other related parties, which questions the importance of multiple directorship on the national 
market.  
The previous studies (Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000) argued for positive 
relationship between presence of government officials on the company’s board of directors and its 
financial performance. We assume that the same logic can be applied for such issue as an IPO, 
because this impact is mostly connected to the favorable perception of the company by investors. 
However, for the purposes of this study we would cover not only the current government 
officials, but directors’ previous in different state institutions. The reason behind is that between 
2008 and 2014 Russian national legislation prohibited direct government officials from being 
appointed on companies’ boards. Apart from that in the variable description section the ties to 
government are divided classified into 3 categories: ties to federal government, ties to regional 
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government and other types of connection (heads of state universities, members of chambers of 
commerce etc.). 
The hypotheses concerning relations with the national authorities is formulated as: 
H4a There is a positive relationship between board’s members’ experience in the 
government organizations and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX 
H4b There is a positive relationship between board’s members’ experience in the 
government organizations and IPO performance of Russian companies on LSE 
Overall, the formulated hypotheses can be summarized in the following figure (Figure 3). 
It shows that we incorporate both inside and outside perspectives on human and social capital. The 
elements of the intellectual capital are predicted to have a positive impact on the firm IPO 
performance.  
 
Figure 3. A model of the impact of intellectual capital on the IPO performance of the 
company. 
It is vital to stress that by accepting/rejecting these hypotheses, we expect to find the answer 
for the research sub-question about the difference of the explored relationships on LSE. 
Methodology 
The framework of the empirical study (Figure 4) shows the key stages of the empirical 
research, which would provide us with statistically significant results, which would serve as a basis 
for further discussion of managerial application of the research findings.  
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Figure 4. The framework of empirical study 
Quantitative method was chosen as the base for the empirical study due to the nature of the 
research question and was proved to be the right one through the analysis of methods applied in 
prior empirical studies. Regression model which would be used to identify the relationship 
between the factors and the outcome, requires representative sample. 
2.2.   Sample selection 
2.2.1.  Data collection 
The chosen period for IPO of Russian companies is from 2002 to 2016. The initial sample 
was formed based one the IPO database PREQVECA (PREQVECA, 2017) together with the 
reports of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2014) and included more than 120 companies. The key 
criterion for considering the company to be a Russian one was adopted from PwC and constituted 
main country of operations, not the jurisdiction, as there is a relatively high number of companies 
registered in Cyprus and other offshore countries. Other criteria included a legal status of Joint 
Stock Company and the appointment of board of directors by the moment of issuing of the IPO 
prospectus. As one of the goals of the empirical study is understanding the difference between IPO 
success level on MOEX and LSE, companies who went public on other stock exchanges, such as 
NYSE, NASDAQ, HKEX etc. were excluded from the list, what left us with 118 companies.  
The next step was to collect the data about IPO performance, IPO prospectus, companies’ 
financial statements in the year prior to public offering and all the relevant information about  
board composition and its individual members. For these respective purposes Thompson Reuters 
EIKON, SPARK and companies’ websites were used. The companies not disclosing information 
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needed for the empirical study were excluded from the list. The final number of the companies in 
the data sample was 101, including 51 (Appendix 3) with IPOs on MOEX (ex MICEX and RTS) 
and 50 (Appendix 4) with IPOs on LSE. It is necessary to point out that in order to make these two 
sub-samples comparable, all the 20 companies which went public on both of the stock exchanges 
were considered to have its IPO on LSE.  
2.2.2.  Sample description 
Opposing to the dominant trend of excluding financial institutions from the sample due to 
the specificity of their core activity, they were kept in the data sample due to the following reasons: 
- Financial institutions represent significant share of companies chosen for MOEX 
subsample (15%), being the most significant ones in terms of size of the IPO; 
- They are characterized by high percentage of directors with ties to government. 
These two reasons show that by excluding these companies from the sample we would bias 
the MOEX subsample and hamper the acceptance/rejection of the Hypothesis 4a about the positive 
relationship between ties to government and IPO performance.  
Furthermore, to elaborate on the comparability of the two sub-subsamples, it is vital to 
analyze the distribution of the companies among industries on MOEX and LSE respectively.  
As it can be seen from the Figure 5, the predominant industries for LSE are Metals & 
Mining (20%) and Oil & Gas (18%), which, basically, are the most important industries of the 
Russian economy accounting for more than 15% of the GDP (Rosstat, 2015). This once again 
proves the relevance of the research aim to clarify the potential reasons for less successful IPO 
performance of Russian companies on LSE, as such parameters as size, age and financial standing 
can be assumed to be more solid for these industries. Such category as Consumer Goods & 
Services also has a significant share of 16%, but this is rather a mix of smaller industries than the 
one itself.   
 
Figure 5. Companies’ distribuition among industries on LSE 
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On the opposite, the main categories for MOEX are Consumer Goods & Services (33%), 
Financial sector (15%) and Energy (18%), while Metal & Mining and Oil & Gas combined account 
only for 12%. 
 
Figure 6. Companies’ distribuition among industries on MOEX 
Overall, despite the existent differences, the subsamples are comparable according to the 
following justification. If we combine Metal & Mining, Oil & Gas, Energy and Heavy Machinery 
to represent the industries closely related to the exploration of natural resources, we would get 
relatively close numbers: 42% for LSE and 35% for MOEX. This assumption would be further 
checked in the descriptive statistics section. 
2.3.   Model and variables 
Taking into account the formulated hypotheses and the review of the previous empirical 
research, we develop an econometric model measuring the actual relationship between board’s 
human and social capital and company’s IPO performance. The metric for measuring IPO 
performance is a percentage difference between the offer price and the price at the end of the first 
day of trading. This approach was used in the research papers by Darmadi et al. (2013) and 
Loughran et al. (2016). Normally, this metric is called IPO underpricing, however, for the purposes 
of this study we would not use this term as it implies negative IPO performance. From this 
perspective, the dependent variables describing different elements of intellectual capital should be 
negatively related to IPO underpricing, which can possibly hamper the understanding of 
managerial applications of this study for the prospective reader. Therefore, we would apply the 
general term – IPO performance.  
However, despite our assumption of the positive influence of the board’s intellectual capital 
on IPO proceeds, we should not ignore the fact that first day positive return primarily depends on 
fundamental financial and structural characteristics of the company. Therefore, it is needed to 
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adopt a vector of control variables. The expected impact of the respective variables should be 
explained.  
First of all, we need to introduce such variable as size of the board measured as a number 
of directors in it. The rationale behind this is that as we use such variables as shares of directors of 
particular kind as well as their average characteristics, we should take into account the actual size 
of the board. In the previous empirical research was found to have both positive and negative 
impact on the IPO performance of the firm (Banerjee and Rangamani, 2014; Certo et al., 2001; 
Darmadi et al., 2013; Mnif, 2010). 
As it was revealed in the literature review, several empirical studies analyzed the impact 
of structural characteristics of the board. The conclusion, which most of them shared, was that the 
share of independent directors in the board is positively perceived by the market. Thus, this 
variable would be applied as control one in our model, and it is expected to have a positive 
relationship with IPO performance. 
Other control variables cover main financial characteristics of the company. As IPO 
success is tend to be positively related to the size of the company, we would apply company’s 
revenue as a potential proxy for measuring it. We would use the natural logarithm of the respective 
figures in order to decrease the potential impact of the outliers. 
An additional financial characteristic of the firm to be incorporated in the model is debt 
financing. It is expected to be positively related to IPO performance as it implies that there is less 
uncertainty about the company (Drucker and Puri, 2005). 
The chosen model is linear regression which can be specified as follows: 
ipoi = αi + β1HCi+ β2SCi + β3Controli + εi,  
where                                                                                                                                               
i - subscript denoting respective company; 
ipoi – dependent variable representing IPO performance of company i; 
αi – constant term covering unobserved factors impacting IPO performance of company i;  
Controli  – vector of control variables of company i;  
HCi – vector of variables covering elements of human capital of board members; 
SCi – vector of variables covering elements of social capital of board of members; 
β1, β2, β3 – vectors of unknowing coefficients in a linear regression equation;  
ε – error term 
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Table 1  
Description of the variables used in the research 
Variable Definition Measurement approach 
Dependent variable 
ipo1 IPO performance Percentage difference between the offer 
price and the price at the end of the first 
day of trading.  
Independent variables (Human capital vector) 
foreign Share of foreign members of the 
board of directors  
Number of directors with citizenship of 
countries other than Russian Federation 
divided by total amount of board members 
ind_exp Average length of directors’ 
industry experience 
Average number of years during which 
board’s members have been working in 
the industry where the analyzed company 
is operating  
Independent variables (Social capital vector) 
tenure Average tenure of the board 
membership 
Average number of years, during which 
directors have been holding seats in a 
company’s board 
gov_share Share of directors with ties to 
government 
Percentage of board’s members with 
working experience in government 
organizations 
gov_bin Presence of directors with ties to 
government 
Binary variable, 1 - one or more board’s 
members with current or prior experience 
in any level of government, 0 – none. 
fed Presence of directors with ties to 
government on federal level 
Binary variable, 1 - one or more board’s 
members with current or prior experience 
in federal level government, 0 – none. 
reg Presence of directors with ties to 
government on regional level 
Binary variable, 1 - one or more board’s 
members with current or prior experience 
in regional level government, 0 – none. 
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other Presence of directors with other 
types of ties to government 
Binary variable, 1 - one or more board’s 
members with current other type of ties to 
government, 0 – none. 
Control variables 
Size Size of the board of directors Number of board members 
indep Share of independent directors Percentage of independent directors in the 
board of directors 
ln_rev Proxy for size of the company Logarithm of the company’s total revenue 
in the year prior to IPO 
df Debt financing Total debt divided by total assets  
It should be highlighted that in the given table there are 5 different dependent variables for 
the board members’ experience in the government organizations. The first one is the overall share 
of directors with different types of ties to government in the board. Even though it is most 
frequently used in the empirical studies, in the regression analysis for this particular research it 
may turn out to be insignificant due to the fact that there are several state-owned companies for 
which this variable would equal to 50% and more. That is why, four binary variables were 
incorporated in the model. They cover the existence of ties to government at all, as well as the 
presence of particular type of connection to the state. Binary variables are focused on the presence, 
not on intensity of the factor, what is, consequently, supposed to provide more accurate results. 
This assumption would be checked in the results section.  
2.4.   Data description 
2.4.1.  Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics of the variables under consideration for each of the respective 
subsamples are presented in the following tables (Table 2 and Table 3). Binary variables for 
measuring the external ties to government are excluded from the tables due to their nature.  
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics for the MOEX subsample 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
ipo1 IPO performance .0593629 .1398773 -.2958333 .4285714 
foreign 
Share of foreign 
members of the 
board of directors 
.0941671 .1800961 0 .7142857 
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ind_exp 
Average length of 
directors’ industry 
experience 
8.427471 4.877346 2.714286 21.77778 
tenure 
Average tenure of 
the board 
membership 
2.308353 2.156415 0 8.153846 
gov_share 
Share of directors 
with ties to 
government 
.1602132 .2074211 0 .9411765 
size 
Size of the board of 
directors 
8.45098 3.294321 3 19 
indep 
Share of independent 
directors 
.3312794 .2104942 0 .8181818 
ln_rev 
Proxy for size of the 
company 
5.114241 2.352218 0 9.397984 
df Debt financing .525666 .2637861 0.1485566 .96 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics for the LSE subsample 
Variable 
Definition 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
ipo1 IPO performance .0296948 .0934732 -.2340426 .2727273 
foreign Share of foreign 
members of the board 
of directors 
.3805938 .2969415 0 1 
ind_exp Average length of 
directors’ industry 
experience 
8.322056 4.990384 1.5 27.33333 
tenure Average tenure of the 
board membership 
1.891317 1.611547 0 7 
gov_share Share of directors with 
ties to government 
.1275169 .2073512 0 1 
size Size of the board of 
directors 
8.44 2.66169 4 18 
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indep Share of independent 
directors 
.3099229 .1693302 0 .7142857 
ln_rev Proxy for size of the 
company 
5.936149 2.201704 .9162907 10.08377 
df Debt financing .5449991 .2671684 0 .98 
 
The given statistics prove some of the basic assumptions of the empirical research and have 
other important implications. First of all, we can see that the average IPO performance for MOEX 
(5,94%) is higher than the one for LSE (2, 97%), while the average size of the company expressed 
by the logarithm of firm’s revenue is indeed higher for LSE, as we assumed from the industry 
distribution in the data sample section. This leads to the comparison of the means of other 
independent variables. Industry experience and share of ex- or current government officials have 
the same figures for both stock exchanges. Average tenure of the board members being slightly 
higher for MOEX and higher proportion of foreigners in the boards for LSE, which is supposed to 
have positive influence of the IPO performance, do not provide any relevant insights for the 
research question as well. As for control variables, they do not allow for explaining the difference 
of the IPO performance too, as the four respective variables have very close values. 
To further elaborate on the difference in IPO performance, it would be logical to look at 
the industry averages for both stock exchanges (Figure 5). We can see that for the majority of 
industries it is probably more beneficial to go public in home country. Almost the only exception 
here is financial sector, which, as we remember from the industry distribution for MOEX, is one 
of the most present on the stock exchange. Even more surprising is the fact that LSE, so popular 
to go public at among Russian companies in Metals & Mining sector, turns out to be unfavorable 
for this purpose providing the average return of -1,3% on the first day of the trade. The respective 
figure for MOEX is 9,6%. The reason for this significant discrepancy is expected to be explained 
by the results of the proposed regression model.  
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Figure 7.  Distribution of average IPO performance between industries on LSE and MOEX. 
2.4.2.  Correlation analysis 
The final step before building the regression model is to analyze the chosen variables for 
correlation, as it could possibly provide valuable insights.  
In case of MOEX (Appendix 5) the assumptions derived from the literature are proved by 
the positive correlation of all of the four independent variables with IPO performance. However, 
the actual significance of these relationship needs to be analyzed by more sophisticated methods 
in the next section.  
With regards to the foreign outside directors, we can see that they do possess valuable 
industry experience as these two variables are in significant positive correlation of 19%. The same 
can be applied for the directors with ties to government, which means that the reason for their 
appointment is a combination of human and social capital, which is indeed one of the assumptions 
of our research. 
On the opposite, judging by the correlation matrix for LSE (Appendix 6), we can already 
conclude that two out of four independent variables, share of foreign directors and industry 
experience, actually have negative relationship with IPO performance. In other words, these 
elements of the board’s intellectual capital of board of directors seems to have negative perception 
by the local investors. The rationale for this would be discussed in the results section.  
As for the ties with government, the correlation provides interesting overview of their 
impact as the variables measuring them have both positive and negative correlation coefficients. 
These means that the both intensity and type of this connection actually matter in case of LSE.   
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2.5. Regression analysis results 
 
The regression model to be used for the analysis was suggested in section 2.3: 
ipo = αi + β1HCi+ β2SCi + β3Controli + εi 
The analysis was performed with STATA 13 package using linear regression model. The 
first model included all the variables measuring the external ties with the government. Then the 
ones, which turned to be insignificant, were excluded from the model parameters. Each 
independent variable of the final model was checked for significance in accordance with 
formulated hypotheses.  The results of both models are presented in the tables below. 
Table 4  
Relationship between elements of board’s intellectual capital and IPO performance of 
Russian companies on MOEX. 
 
Model 1 – (Including all the 
variables for measuring ties to 
government) 
Model 2 – (Including significant 
variables measuring ties to 
government) 
foreign 0.0560 0.0225 
ind_exp 0.0115** 0.118** 
tenure 0.0084 0.0127 
gov-share 0.0778  
gov_bin -0.0686  
fed 0.0984* 0.0750* 
reg 0.0265  
other 0.0705  
size -0.0105 -0.0072 
indep 0.2135** 0.2035** 
ln_rev -0.0191** -0.221** 
df -0.0930 -0.0773 
сons 0.0736 0.0534 
R2 0.4432 0.4033 
p value 0.0150 0.0032 
Notes: 
*** Denotes significance at 1% level 
** Denotes significance at 5% level 
* Denotes significance at 10% level 
As we can see from the table for MOEX (Table 4), both models were significant (p value 
< 0.05). R2 of the second one is equal to 0.4033, which means that the chosen variables, both 
independent and control ones, explain 40,33% of the variance in IPO returns on the first day, which 
is a relatively high percentage. 
As far as ties to government are concerned, we can see that share of ex- and current 
government officials as well as the presence of connections with regional authorities and other 
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types of connections are not significantly related to IPO performance, but at least their beta 
coefficients have positive value. At the same time, such variable as share of government officials 
has even a negative value of beta coefficient, which goes along with our rationale for introducing 
binary variables. All in all, binary variable for presence of ties to federal government is significant 
at 10% level (p value = 0.075), which means that we can accept H4a with specification for presence 
of ex- or current federal officials. 
Board’s average tenure and share of foreign directors are not significantly related with IPO 
performance according to their p values, but they have positive beta coefficients, which leads us 
to the conclusion that we can neither accept, nor reject H2a and H3a.  
On the opposite, average industry experience of the board members has a p value of 0.014 
which shows significance at 5% level. That means that we can accept H1a that states that this 
parameter is positively related to IPO performance of the Russian companies on MOEX.  
Finally, it is important to pay attention to the beta coefficients and respective p values of 
introduced control variables. On the one hand, size of the board and level of debt financing are not 
significant parameters of the model and have negative beta coefficients, which, consequently, 
shows that having too many members and high debt burden have negative perception by the 
Russian investors. On the other hand, two other variables, share of independent directors and size 
of the company measured as its revenue are significant at 5% level. However, while the share of 
independent directors has positive impact on the IPO performance in accordance with our 
assumption, firm’s revenue has a negative beta coefficient, which means that after a certain 
threshold the size of the company is starting to decrease the level of attractiveness of investment 
in its shares.  
As for the companies which went public on LSE (Table 5), the two models proved to be 
significant as well, having p values of 0.0341 and 0.0092. The R squared is almost the same as in 
the case of MOEX with two models explaining 43,84% and 42,23% of variance respectively. 
However, despite these similarities the model got the results which do not coincide with the one 
for MOEX to a great extent.  
Table 5  
Relationship between elements of board’s intellectual capital and IPO performance of 
Russian companies on LSE. 
 
Model 1 – (Including all the 
variables for measuring ties to 
government) 
Model 2 – (Including significant 
variables measuring ties to 
government) 
foreign -0.0957 -0.1047* 
ind_exp -0.0048 -0.0048* 
tenure 0.0212** 0.0210** 
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gov_share -0.0068  
gov_bin 0.0748  
fed -0.1218* -0.0750* 
reg 0.0150  
other 0.0426  
size -0.0049 -0.0053 
indep -0.0038 -0.0216 
ln_rev -0.0300*** -0.0306*** 
df -0.0664 -0.0624 
cons 0.1800 0.1976 
R2 0.4384 0.4223 
p value 0.0341 0.0092 
Notes: 
*** Denotes significance at 1% level 
** Denotes significance at 5% level 
* Denotes significance at 10% level 
The situation with the variables measuring external ties of board of directors with 
government organizations is even more complicated than in the previous case. The overall 
presence of ex- and current government officials together with presence of connections on regional 
and other levels have positive beta coefficients, which determine their positive impact. However, 
as these are not significant according to their respective p values, we should switch our attention 
to the one with the prescribed negative impact. First, similarly to the MOEX case, we have the 
share of government officials, which is not a significant variable according to the test statistics. 
Then, on the contrary to our assumptions and MOEX’s results, the presence of ex- or current 
federal officials has a negative impact on IPO performance and is significant at 10% level. The 
possible reasons for it would be highlighted in the discussion section. All in all, we have enough 
evidence to reject the hypothesis H4b. 
Average industry experience and the share of foreign directors have negative beta 
coefficients and are significant at 10% level in the second model. This leads to the rejection of 
both hypotheses H1b and H2b. Therefore, we can say that not only the human capital of foreign 
directors is not perceived to be of value to the investors at LSE, but the overall human capital of 
the board of directors as well. This discussion would be continued in the next section. 
What is valued by the investors in London, though, is the average board tenure. We can 
assume that the focus is put on the internal social capital of the board and its efficiency as a 
corporate governance mechanism. The tenure variable is significant at 5% level which means that 
we can accept the hypothesis H3b. 
With regards to the control variables, it should be mentioned that the results are similar 
with the ones for MOEX as debt financing and board’s size have negative beta coefficients and 
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are not significant, whereas the logarithm of the company’s revenue is significant at 1% level and 
has negative connotation, which once again points attention to the fact that there should be a certain 
threshold for this parameter and it may have U-inverted relationship with the IPO performance. 
However, there is also the difference with the sample of MOEX as the share independent directors 
has a negative beta coefficient too. However, this goes along with already suggested explanation 
about the primary importance of the board’s internal ties. 
Overall, summarizing all the above findings, we can say that it was found that both human 
and social capital of the board of directors have positive impact on the IPO performance of the 
Russian companies on MOEX with the predominant factors being average industry experience of 
the board members and the existence of ties to federal government (Table 6). On the contrary, in 
the case of LSE most of the elements of intellectual capital were found to have even a negative 
relationship with IPO success. The only exception is the internal social capital of the board 
measured as average tenure of board members.  
Table 6 
Summary of the results of linear regression model 
Hypothesis MOEX (a) LSE (b) 
Positive relationship between 
“foreign” and “ipo1” 
- Rejected 
Positive relationship between 
“ind_exp” and “ipo1” 
Accepted Rejected 
Positive relationship between 
“tenure” and “ipo1” 
- Accepted 
Positive relationship between 
“fed” and “ipo1” 
Accepted Rejected 
With these findings we can proceed to the discussion section of the empirical research, 
where we would try to analyze these results in more details and provide the insights about possible 
rationale behind them. 
2.6.   Discussion    
2.6.1.  Research findings 
In this section we will discuss the summarized model results and attempt to link them to 
the prior studies in the fields of intellectual capital and corporate governance.  
As in the case of MOEX we did not encounter any contradiction to our initial assumptions, 
meaning that none of the hypotheses were rejected, it would be logical to start with discussing the 
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results for this subsample, and then compare them with the ones from LSE for each pair of 
hypotheses respectively.  
First, it is necessary to elaborate on the accepted hypothesis about human capital of board 
of directors for MOEX. Industry experience, which lies at its core, was found to have a positive 
impact on IPO performance. This goes along with the findings of previous empirical research 
(Drobetz et al., 2016; Dulyak, 2015; Kor and Misangyi, 2008), which identified positive 
relationship between average industry experience of the board members and firm financial 
performance. The study by Dulyak (2015) is particularly relevant as it covers the sample of 
Russian companies. However, turning to the results for LSE we can see the same hypothesis was 
rejected, as average industry experience was found to have negative relationship with IPO results. 
There could be several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, high value of average 
industry experience may be interpreted to have negative correlation with the executive and top-
management experience, as it implies having a career path in the same field from top to bottom. 
Second, for the most popular industries among the LSE sub-sample being Metals & Mining, Oil 
& Gas the high value for industry can be linked to non-economic/management background, which, 
consequently, depreciates the overall value of the company’s human capital for some investors. 
Third, they could be a higher value assigned for cross-industry experience by investors at LSE. 
Overall, we can suggest that further research of this issue should aim at testing the relationship 
between total experience of board’s members at senior and executive positions and IPO 
performance. This could potentially clarify the findings of the given research.  
The second element of human capital under consideration was the share of foreign directors 
in the board. The hypothesis of its positive relationship with IPO success was not accepted for 
MOEX, but we witnessed overall positive impact from the beta coefficient. This means that in 
general Russian investors assign certain value for the assumed expertise brought by foreign 
directors, which supports the findings of similar research conducted for the developing market 
(Choi et al., 2012) and justifies the overall high share of foreigners in Russian boards, but this is 
still not a decisive factor for IPO underpricing. Nevertheless, in case of LSE the hypothesis was 
rejected. This finding can be linked to the idea of Volonte (2016) about the provision of intellectual 
capital by the directors. In other words, in case of LSE the presence of foreigners per se does not 
have positive connotation. It is taken to the next level, as different elements of their intellectual 
capital are put under consideration. As far as this point is concerned, we can stress that through 
the analysis of the board characteristics of Russian companies, we can conclude that not all foreign 
directors possess the desired level of expertise. It is especially relevant for the companies registered 
in offshore zones, as quite frequently the people responsible for the registration of their office there 
become the members of the board while having zero awareness of the company’s day-to-day 
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business activities. This argument can be supported by the value from correlation matrix covering 
the interdependence between share of foreign directors and average industry experience, which is 
19% for MOEX and only 6,5% on LSE. This does not contradict to the findings with regards to 
hypothesis H2b as foreign directors normally possess the management experience in the industry, 
which we still assume to be positively related with firm performance. 
Proceeding to the social capital, it would be more logical for us to start with the internal 
perspective as none of the hypotheses about average board’s tenure was rejected. In both cases this 
variable was found to have positive relationship with IPO performance, and in the case of LSE 
this relationship was proved to be significant. These findings coincide with the ones from prior 
research (Carpenter, 2002; Fisher and Pollock, 2004). However, we should keep in mind that this 
relationship might be U-inverted as the means of average board’s tenure for our subsamples equal 
to 2,31 and 1,89 do not allow for rejecting this assumption. It should be highlighted that though 
the mean is lower for LSE (1,89 < 2,31), the impact is significant for this sub-sample. This means 
that local investors prescribe primary value for board’s internal ties and do believe in their positive 
impact on the board’s efficiency and, hence, firm performance.  
Finally, we reached the variable which provided the most controversial findings in our 
empirical research - the one measuring external ties to government. Already at the stage of creating 
the research design, we introduced five different variables for its measurement. This proved to be 
the right approach, as we got contradictory results for them. In case of MOEX the binary variable 
for presence of any kind of relationship with government turned out to have negative beta 
coefficient. This together with the positive coefficients for all the other binary variables 
representing three different levels of connections, leads us to the conclusion that having these ties 
on multiple level may have negative perception by Russian investors and can be considered as 
overdependence on the state. Nevertheless, binary variable for external ties to the federal 
government proved to be significant. Therefore, we accepted the hypothesis H4a which goes along 
with the findings of other empirical studies (Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2005; Peng and Luo 2000). 
However, we should emphasize the peculiarities of the MOEX case. First, as it is a binary variable 
and the one defining the share is not significant, there is a certain threshold for a number of ex- or 
current government officials after which the extensity of the ties begin to have less positive 
perception by the investors. Second, the most value is prescribed to the connections at the federal 
level.  
In case of LSE we witnessed positive beta coefficients for binary variables for regional and 
other ties to government as well as overall presence of the ties, whereas the share of government 
officials and link to federal government proved to have negative relationship, the latter one with 
significance at 10% level. There is a possible explanation for this. First, the federal government is 
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associated with corruption within the context of Russian national economy. Second, the external 
ties to federal government are perceived as a sign of deep involvement of the state in the company’s 
operations, which, consequently, triggers the bias about low efficiency of such companies. The 
share of government officials in this case is directly related to the federal level officials as this type 
of connection is normally the most intensive one.   
2.6.2.  Managerial implications 
Having discussed the results of our hypothesis testing, we can highlight their possible 
interpretation from the business perspective. We can already conclude that we were able to derive 
valuable insights for possible managerial implications, which should be explained in more details 
in this section. 
First and most definitive implication of this study is that there is a clear relationship 
between intellectual capital of the directors appointed to the board of the company prior to IPO 
and its results. What is more, this relationship is not homogeneous on different stock exchanges, 
namely on MOEX and LSE, and can be both positive and negative.  
Using these insights, we can, for example, explain the surprising difference in the average 
level of IPO underpricing (9,6% and -1,3%) of the companies from Metals & Mining industry on 
the two stock exchanges, which we discovered in the sample description section. On MOEX these 
companies, being related to the government and having foreign directors on board as well as 
average industry experience of the board members of more than 10 years, were perceived as a 
great investment opportunity. At the same time, on LSE these advantages turned out to have 
negative connotation such as low efficiency due to state control and having directors with low 
executive experience and other kinds of expertise.  
Overall, these insights can be linked to the decreasing number of Russian companies opting 
for LSE as the stock exchange for their IPO, especially the one affiliated to the state. However, as 
private companies may still choose this option, they should take the measures in advance as 
appointing the board exactly in the year prior to going public would decrease the chances for 
successful IPO. Another point to consider is the quality of the intellectual capital brought by these 
directors. 
2.6.3.  Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The empirical research was aimed at understanding the relationship between different 
elements of human and social capital of board of directors and IPO performance of Russian 
companies on MOEX and LSE. The obtained results help to explain the different levels of IPO 
success on these two stock exchanges. Although, the research objective was reached and the 
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findings have clear managerial implications, this study is subject to some limitations which show 
the directions for future research.  
First of all, despite using the framework which covers both human and social capital with 
their internal and external perspectives, the four chosen variables still cannot be considered to be 
covering all the dimensions of the board’s intellectual capital. As we already found throughout the 
research, one variable was not able to cover all the relevant information about directors’ previous 
experience. The future research should aim at deepening the knowledge about the impact of 
different kind of expertise of the board’s members. With regards to the internal social capital, the 
possible direction for more in-depth analysis is to study board’s internal dynamics and procedures, 
as its tenure already proved to have positive impact on IPO performance. However, this research 
will require collecting primary data rather than collecting the secondary one due to limited amount 
of disclosed information about this issue. The final point with regards to variables limitations is 
that as we got in the results section most of the introduced, the control variables were not 
significantly related to the dependent variable, which hampers the managerial application of the 
model findings. The further research should attempt to identify more significant control variables.  
The second limitation of this study concerns the selected sample. The number of companies 
in the subsamples is 50 and 51 respectively, which can be perceived to be the limitation for their 
representativeness. However, these study covers all the IPOs in the given period with available 
data about the board of directors. One possible way to extend this study, as it basically rather 
covers the patterns on particular stock exchanges than on the national market, is to extend the 
subsamples to the companies from other countries with similar economic characteristics present 
on LSE and MOEX, such as for example Ukraine, Belarus and other ex-Soviet countries. Apart 
from that, the limited amount of observations did not allow for a proper industry breakdown and 
exclusion of financial sector common for this kind of studies. Nevertheless, we believe that these 
issues are less relevant for IPO underpricing. Possible solution, which can be implemented in 
further research, is to extend the research to other countries as in the previous case. 
The final limitation is related to data collection. We used primarily second data from such 
sources as IPO prospectus, annual reports and different databases. The applicability of secondary 
data for measuring such variables as share of foreigners and average board’s tenure is not 
questioned, whereas in case of average industry experience and ties to the government the coverage 
should not be perceived to be the complete one. Although, we conducted an in-depth analysis of 
the directors’ biographies, in some cases the information was still limited. Therefore, future 
research should attempt to collect primary data about elements of intellectual capital under 
consideration, especially about the external ties to the government, as there can be indirect ones, 
which could possibly be used as a separate variable. 
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2.7.  Summary of Chapter 2 
In this chapter we conducted an empirical study which determined the relationship between 
intellectual capital of board of directors and IPO performance of Russian companies. This 
relationship was proved to be different on MOEX and LSE.  
Based on the conducted literature review we formulated four hypotheses, two of them 
covering elements of human capital and the other two covering the social one. These pairs of 
hypotheses correspond to the internal and external perspectives respectively. Thus, director´s 
average industry experience covers internal perspective of human capital, whereas the share of 
foreign directors stands for external one. As for social capital, internal ties are measured by board´s 
average tenure and among the external ties the choice was made in favor of ties to government due 
to the peculiarities of Russian economy. 
The final data sample consists of 101 Russian companies, which had their IPOs form 2002 
to 2016. 50 of them comprise the LSE subsample and 51 the MOEX one (ex MICEX and RTS). 
All the 20 companies, which went public on both stock exchanges simultaneously, were 
considered to have the IPO on LSE for the sake of comparability of the subsamples.  
The chosen model is linear regression. The independent variable is IPO performance 
measured as percentage difference between the offer price and the price at the end of the first day 
of trading (IPO Underpricing). The dependent variables comprise 3 vectors: vector of independent 
variables describing human capital, vector of independent variables describing social capital and 
vector describing control variables.  
Regression analysis provided the results which allowed for accepting and rejecting several 
hypotheses. In case of MOEX, director’s average industry experience and the existence of the ties 
to federal government proved to have positive relationship with IPO performance. Among the 
control variables the share of independent directors has significant positive relationship with IPO 
results, whereas the size of the company measured as a logarithm of its revenue has a significant 
negative beta coefficient.  
As for LSE subsample, we can conclude that the results are more controversial. Only the 
hypothesis about positive relationship between average board’s tenure with IPO performance 
turned out to be accepted, whereas the other 3 elements of intellectual capital have a significant 
negative relationship with IPO results. With regards to control variables, the same results as for 
MOEX were received for the size of the company. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the hypotheses derived from the literature review are 
mostly applicable for the domestic stock market. For LSE the only factor to be positively perceived 
by investors is the collaborative experience of the directors. Such characteristics as relationship 
with the state, share of foreigners and average industry experience of the board members have 
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negative connotation. The possible explanation is inefficiency being associated with state-owned 
companies, low perceived quality of the intellectual capital provided by foreigners to the Russian 
boards and a higher value assigned for executive experience rather than industry one. All in all, 
for a Russian company the first aspect to be taken into consideration while choosing the stock 
exchange for an IPO is the intensity of the ties of its board to the state. Apart from that, it is vital 
to form a board of directors prior to IPO in order to enhance its internal social capital by the 
moment of IPO. 
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CONCLUSION 
Anticipating the recovery of Russian IPO market within the context of restricted access to 
financing, it is necessary to evaluate the options available for stock exchange choice. Previously, 
Russian companies tended to opt for LSE or MOEX. However, the key success factors on one or 
another stock exchange remain an open question. Among the parameters, which draw the 
investors’ attention except for the main financial indicators, corporate governance is one of the 
most important ones. Board of directors is a central mechanism of corporate governance, and in 
this paper we aim at defining its impact on IPO results applying the intellectual capital framework. 
The choice of the framework is justified by the fact that the provision of intellectual capital can be 
considered to be the reason for directors’ appointments to the boards together with an overall shift 
towards structural elements of the board in the previous empirical studies. 
The goal of this study was to analyze the relationship between different elements of 
intellectual capital of board of directors and IPO performance, using evidence from Russian 
companies which went public on MOEX and LSE. We adopted the elements which were proved 
to have significant positive relationship with different aspects of firm performance in the previous 
empirical studies in the literature review section. 
Four pairs of hypotheses have been tested: 
H1a (H1b) There is a positive relationship between the share of foreign directors in the 
board of directors and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX (LSE) 
H2a (H2b) There is a positive relationship between average experience in the industry of 
the board’s members and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX (LSE) 
H3a (H3b) There is a positive relationship between the average tenure of the board’s 
members and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX (LSE) 
H4a (H4b) There is a positive relationship between board’s members’ experience in the 
government organizations and IPO performance of Russian companies on MOEX (LSE) 
We performed the linear regression analysis on the hand-collected data sample of Russian 
companies with IPOs on MOEX and LSE. 
The results of the analysis allowed for both accepting and rejecting of some of these 
hypotheses and emphasized the clear difference in relationship between intellectual capital of 
board of directors and IPO performance on MOEX and LSE. For MOEX all the dependent 
variables had positive beta coefficients and director’s average industry experience and board’s 
members experience in federal government turned out to have significant positive relationship 
with IPO results. On the contrary, in case of LSE three out four elements of intellectual capital 
have significant negative relationship with IPO performance, namely share of foreign directors, 
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board members’ average industry experience and ties to federal government. Board’s average 
tenure has significant positive impact on IPO perspectives.  
Based on these findings we can conclude that the key element which determines the 
difference in success level of Russian companies on MOEX and LSE identified in this research is 
the intensity of its relationship with the state. What is perceived to be an advantage on the domestic 
market, turns out to have negative connotation by foreign investors. Therefore, the companies with 
high intensity of ties to the state should abstain from going public on LSE. Nonetheless, if a private 
company opts for LSE, it should make sure to establish the board of directors in advance to IPO 
in order to develop its internal social capital. Apart from that, it is necessary to pay special attention 
to the quality of human capital brought by foreign directors as well as to the expertise of its board’s 
members in different fields rather than in one particular industry.  
Given the context of the research and the scope of the topic, this study is subject to certain 
limitations, which show the directions for future research. First, the list of dependent variables is 
limited by two elements from human and social capital, which leaves the room for further 
investigation of the impact of board’s intellectual capital on IPO results. Second, regarding the 
sample selection, we can say that in order to elaborate more on the difference between domestic 
and foreign stock markets, it is necessary to conduct the research for the countries with similar 
economic context. Finally, the data collection process can be improved by enriching the secondary 
data with the primary one. 
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Appendix 1. Share of foreigners in Russian boards (Deloitte, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Average board composition of Russian companies (PwC, 2012). 
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Appendix 3. Companies in MOEX subsample. 
№ Company Year № Company Year 
1 Russneft’ 2016 27 Bank Sankt-Peterburg 2007 
2 FG Budushcheye 2016 28 M.Video 2007 
3 NKHP 2015 29 DBMP 2007 
4 Evroplan 2015 30 Armada 2007 
5 MKB 2015 31 Rosinter Restaurants 2007 
6 OVK 2015 32 TGK-5 2007 
7 TPG Aessel’ 2013 33 Dixy Group 2007 
8 AK Alrosa 2013 34 Bank Vozrozhdenie 2007 
9 Zhivoy Ofis 2012 35 Sberbank 2007 
10 Moskovskaya Birzha 2012 36 OGK-3 2007 
11 Multisistema 2012 37 TGK-1 2007 
12 Utinet.ru 2011 38 UK Arsagera 2007 
13 Pharmsynthez 2010 39 WTC Moscow 2006 
14 Mostotrest 2010 40 OGK-5 (Enel) 2006 
15 RNT 2010 41 Raspadskaya 2006 
16 DIOD 2010 42 OGK-2 2006 
17 Kuzbasskaya Toplivlaya 
Kompaniya 
2010 43 Magnit 2006 
18 Protek 2010 44 Razgulay Group 2006 
19 Russkoe More 2010 45 Belon Group 2006 
20 Institut Stvolovykh Kletok 
Cheloveka 
2010 46 Sollers 2005 
21 Mechel 2009 47 PAVA 2005 
22 Bank of Moscow 2009 48 Lebedyanskiy 2005 
23 TGK-6 2008 49 Kalina 2004 
24 TGK-7 2008 50 Irkut 2004 
25 TGK-13 2008 51 RBC IS 2002 
26 Sinergiya 2007   
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Appendix 4. Companies in LSE subsample. 
№ Company Year № Company Year 
1 Lenta 2014 26 MMK 2007 
2 TCS 2013 27 NCSP 2007 
3 Megafon 2012 28 Polymetal 2007 
4 RusPetro 2012 29 Sitroniks 2007 
5 MD Medical 
Group 
2012 30 Uralkaliy 2007 
6 Global Port 
Invetsments 
2011 31 Pharmstandart 2007 
7 Polymetal 
International 
2011 32 Amur Minearals 2006 
8 HMS  2011 33 GALS-Development 2006 
9 Etalon 2011 34 Petroneft Resources 2006 
10 Nomos Bank 2011 35 Comstar 2006 
11 Rusagro 2011 36 Rosneft' 2006 
12 PhosAgro 2011 37 Severstal 2006 
13 FSK YeES 2011 38 TMK 2006 
14 Mail.ru 2010 39 Cherkizovo Group 2006 
15 O’key 2010 40 Chelyabinsk Zink 
Plant 
2006 
16 TransContainer 2010 41 Amtel Vredestein 2005 
17 RusHydro 2009 42 Evraz 2005 
18 Eurasia Drilling 2008 43 IMSG 2005 
19 Globaltrans 2008 44 Urals Energy 2005 
20 Akron 2008 45 X5 Retail Group 2005 
21 AFI Development 2007 46 Zirax 2005 
22 Integra 2007 47 Sistema 2005 
23 Bank VTB 2007 48 NLMK 2005 
24 PIK 2007 49 Novatek 2005 
25 Gruppa LSR 2007 50 TransSibir’ 2003 
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Appendix 5. Correlation matrix for MOEX 
   ipo1 foreign 
 
indexp tenure 
  
govsh gov_b   fed  reg  other  size indep ln_rev  df 
ipo1  1.000             
foreign  0.167  1.000            
indexp  0.367  0.190  1.000           
tenure  0.309 -0.003  0.583  1.000          
govsh  0.147 -0.189  0.201  0.342 1.000         
gov_b  0.149 -0.070  0.148  0.178 0.701  1.000        
fed  0.184 -0.126  0.095  0.263 0.521  0.585 1.000       
reg  0.037 -0.060  0.070  0.153 0.504  0.613 0.120  1.000      
othr  0.281 -0.081  0.185  0.251 0.459  0.503 0.149  0.322  1.000     
size -0.037  0.014  0.088  0.299 0.496  0.367 0.425  0.269  0.221  1.000    
indep  0.243  0.266 -0.079  0.019 0.127  0.072 0.189 -0.155 -0.012  0.266 1.000   
ln_rev -0.155 -0.076  0.316  0.335 0.322  0.171 0.364  0.029 -0.059  0.421 0.064 1.000  
df -0.017  0.108  0.213  0.151 0.187 -0.039 0.012 -0.086  0.013 -0.045 0.132 0.106 1.000 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6. Correlation matrix for LSE 
   ipo1 foreign 
 
indexp tenure 
  
govsh gov_b   fed  reg  other size indep ln_rev  df 
ipo1  1.000             
foreign -0.111  1.000            
indexp -0.119  0.065  1.000           
tenure  0.279 -0.316  0.135  1.000          
govsh -0.007 -0.451  0.019  0.234 1.000         
gov_b  0.055 -0.501  0.104  0.392 0.647 1.000        
fed -0.017 -0.607  0.112  0.506 0.678 0.815  1.000       
reg  0.004 -0.459  0.216  0.231 0.571 0.553  0.579 1.000      
othr -0.044  0.044  0.053 -0.028 0.123 0.420  0.040 0.640 1.000     
size -0.101 -0.325 -0.090  0.231 0.265 0.462  0.447 0.351 0.151 1.000    
indep -0.088  0.239  0.057 -0.221 0.042 0.041 -0.026 0.230 0.230 -0.35 1.000   
ln_rev -0.148 -0.511 -0.286  0.214 0.383 0.312  0.370 0.070 0.067 0.337 -0.184 1.000  
df -0.290  0.054 -0.087  0.190 0.017 0.001 -0.155 0.137 0.137 0.133  0.087 0.229 1.000 
 
 
 
